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Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenditure in Turkey: 
Analysis of the Household Budget Surveys 2003-2008 
 
 
 
Abstract: 7KLV SDSHU DQDO\VHV WKH SUHYDOHQFH RI µFDWDVWURSKLF¶ RXW-of-pocket health 
expenditure in Turkey and identifies the factors which are associated with its risk using the 
Turkish Household Budget Surveys from 2003 to 2008. A sample selection approach based 
on Sartori (2003) is adopted to allow for the potential selection problem which may arise if 
poor households choose not to seek health care due to concerns regarding its affordability. 
The results suggest that poor households are less likely to seek health care as compared to 
non-poor households and that a negative relationship between poverty and experiencing 
catastrophic health expenditure remains even after allowing for such selection bias. Our 
findings, which may assist policy-makers concerned with health care system reforms, also 
highlight factors such as insurance coverage, which may protect households from the risk of 
incurring catastrophic health expenditure. 
JEL Classification: I10, C25 
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1. Introduction 
Out-of-pocket health care expenditure, where individuals and households pay for health care 
out of their own resources, is an important feature of health care systems all over the world. 
Furthermore, the impact of health care financing systems on the welfare of households, 
particularly poor households, is regarded as an important issue faced by policy makers when 
developing health care systems and insurance mechanisms (Xu et al., 2003). It is widely 
accepted that financial protection against high levels of out-of-pocket health expenditure 
should be one of the primary goals in designing health sector reform strategies since it has 
been argued that high levels of out-of-pocket health expenditure violate the vertical equity 
principle, which requires that payment should be related to ability to pay (World Health 
Organisation, 2000). 
It is apparent that, in order to reform health care systems in line with this objective, it 
is necessary to define what is meant by an unacceptably high level of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure, frequently UHIHUUHGWRDVµFDWDVWURSKLF¶LQWKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUH. There is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, no consensus over the specific definition of catastrophic health expenditure in 
the existing literature. Russel (2004), however, does provide a comprehensive definition of 
catastrophic health expenditureµthe term catastrophic implies that such expenditure levels are 
likely to force household members to cut their consumption of other minimum needs, trigger 
productive asset sales or high levels of dHEW DQG OHDG WR LPSRYHULVKPHQW¶ (p. 147). The 
premise is that households should not spend more than a specific percentage of their income 
on health care to allow them to maintain other basic needs (Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003). 
The most common approach is to set a threshold in terms of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure as a percentage of income (e.g. Berki, 1986, Wyszewianski, 1986). However, it is 
not clear what threshold levels of income can be considered catastrophic. As Wyszewianski 
(1986) argues, high out-of-pocket health expenditure is not always catastrophic in terms of 
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imposing a severe financial burden on a household, whereas a small amount of expenditure on 
health care can be financially devastating for poor households. Therefore, in the existing 
literature, a range of threshold values has been commonly used. Health care expenditure has 
typically included co-payments, consultation fees, purchase of medicine, hospital bills and 
other types of out-of-pocket expenditure on health and generally excludes insurance 
premiums (e.g. Ranson, 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).1 A further area of debate 
concerns the choice of denominator used to define the catastrophic level of expenditure. Some 
studies use total household income as the denominator (e.g. Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; 
2¶'Rnnell and Doorslaer, 2005), whereas other studies use disposable household income 
defined as household income remaining after the deduction of food expenditure (e.g. Xu et al., 
2003). 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on catastrophic health expenditure by 
analysing the prevalence and determinants of catastrophic health expenditure in Turkey using 
the Turkish Household Budget Surveys (HBS) from 2003 to 2008. Turkey is a particularly 
interesting case for investigating such issues due to two main reasons. Firstly, out-of-pocket 
health expenditure accounted for 22% of total expenditure on health care in 2007, which 
decreased sharply to 17% in 2008 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011). Although this ratio is 
below the WHO European Region average of 30% in 2008 (WHO, 2010), it is higher than the 
OECD average of 16% and countries with advanced social security systems, for example, 7% 
in France, 13% in Germany, 6% in Netherlands and 11% in the UK in 2008 (OECD, 2010). 
Secondly, the Turkish health care system has been restructured with the Health 
Transformation Programme (HTP) and ongoing health reforms since 2003, which potentially 
affect out-of-pocket health care expenditure. However, the first health policies related to 
                                                          
1
 The reason for excluding insurance premiums and taxation is that this type of health expenditure is arguably not 
made at the time the household received the service and, moreover, can be anticipated in advance. Any 
reimbursement from a health insurance scheme is also deducted from the out-of-pocket health expenditure of 
households. However, there are some studies which do include insurance premiums and social insurance 
contributions in the numerator (e.g. Knaul, 2000; Murray et al., 2000). 
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financial protection were implemented in 2004. One of the most important health reforms is 
related to improved access to private health care facilities through contracts with private 
hospitals for all members of the various health insurance schemes. In 2005, for example, the 
members of the Social Insurance Organisation (SSK) and the members of the insurance 
scheme for self-employed individuals (Bag-Kur) have obtained access to outpatient and 
inpatient services in contracted private hospitals.2 However, with the Law on Social Security 
and Universal Health Insurance in 2006, in order to encourage the private sector to contract 
with the Social Security Institute (SSI), private hospitals are allowed to charge up to 30% of 
the SSI tariff and extra charges for amenities (OECD, 2008). Thus, even if access to private 
facilities has been improved with the health reforms, extra payment to use private care is still 
required. 
Furthermore, in 2006, a single social security organization was established to unify all 
insurance schemes under the SSI. In 2007, it was accepted that all citizens of Turkey would 
have access to free primary health care even if they are not entitled to any health insurance 
scheme.3 The implementation of a Universal Health Insurance system was started in 2008 but 
unifying all insurance schemes has not yet been completed and a large proportion of the 
population still does not have adequate financial protection. In light of these reforms, it can be 
argued that the time period of the study is particularly interesting.4 In this regard, Erus and 
Aktakke (2012) investigated the effect of health care reforms on out-of-pocket health 
expenditure for public insurees in Turkey using the Household Budget Surveys for 2003 and 
2006. They found that health reforms improved access to health care facilities and decreased 
the incidence of high levels of health care expenditure but these reforms were found to 
                                                          
2
 With this change, the benefits of the members of these insurance schemes were improved to the level of the 
members of the civil servants¶ insurance scheme (Government Employees Retirement Fund, GERF). 
3
 In addition, the members of the Green Card scheme have officially obtained the same benefits as enrolees in 
other health insurance schemes in 2008 (OECD, 2008). 
4
 The Turkish health care system is aligned with that of the EU countries (OECD, 2008) and the area of financial 
protection in terms of responding to the health needs of the population on the basis of financial accessibility is 
among WKHLPSRUWDQWLVVXHVLQ7XUNH\¶V EU membership negotiations (European Commission, 2010).  
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particularly benefit the households with higher income levels. It should also be stated that 
informal payment is a common phenomenon in the Turkish health care system. Tatar et al. 
(2007), using a questionnaire adopted from a wider international study, found that informal 
out-of-pocket health expenditure accounts for 25% of total out-of-pocket expenditure in 
Turkey in 2002. This finding indicates that out-of-pocket health expenditure may be higher 
than the official statistics suggest.  
Our paper makes a potentially important methodological contribution to the literature 
on catastrophic health expenditure by controlling for the potential selection bias related to 
health care seeking behaviour. Arguably, one of the most important shortcomings of many of 
the existing studies (including Erus and Aktakke, 2012) is the failure to account for the 
potential selection problem which may arise if poor households choose not to seek health care 
due to concerns regarding its affordability. Although the potential selection problem may bias 
the estimation results, most of the existing studies ignore households that do not seek 
treatment and this measurement problem is accepted as a limitation (e.g. Russell, 2004; Xu et 
al. 2003). As Kawabata et al. (2002) emphasise, the highest proportion of catastrophic health 
expenditure is not always experienced by the lowest income group, which may reflect the fact 
that catastrophic health expenditure can only be incurred if the household seeks and spends 
money on health care. 5  Ignoring such issues may bias the estimation results since poor 
households, which arguably have the most need of financial protection, are essentially 
excluded from the measurement (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002). In this respect, this paper 
makes a methodological contribution by investigating the determinants of the probability of 
incurring catastrophic health expenditure in Turkey whilst attempting to adjust for the medical 
                                                          
5
 Pradhan and Prescott (2002) used a simulation model to construct a distribution of needed health expenditure 
using household survey data for Indonesia. Catastrophic health expenditure was defined as out-of-pocket health 
H[SHQGLWXUH H[FHHGLQJ  RI WKH KRXVHKROG¶V WRWDO H[SHQGLWXUH 7KH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI FDWDVWURSKLF KHDOWK
expenditure by expenditure quintiles indicated that richer households are more likely to spend 10% of their 
income on health care as compared to poor households in Indonesia. The results of their simulation analysis 
indicated that subsidising inpatient care would result in the greatest decrease in the proportion of households 
with catastrophic health expenditure while subsidising outpatient care would provide benefits particularly for the 
very poor segment of the population. 
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care seeking behaviour of households by using the sample selection approach introduced by 
Sartori (2003). 
No clear pattern of the socioeconomic distribution of health expenditure within 
developing countries has been found in the existing literature. For example, Makinen et al. 
(2000) reviewed household survey data from eight developing countries and countries in 
transition and found that there was no distinctive pattern in health expenditure as a proportion 
of income by income quintiles. In Burkina Faso, Paraguay and Thailand, regressive trends 
were found (i.e. the wealthier quintiles spend a lower percentage of their total consumption on 
health care than poorer quintiles), whereas in Guatemala and South Africa, progressive trends 
were identified. Moreover, wealthier households were found to be more likely to seek health 
care when they need it than poorer households, which may reflect concerns regarding its 
affordability amongst the poor. 
In a similar vein, Xu et al. (2003) used household survey data from 59 countries to 
investigate the levels and determinants of catastrophic health expenditure. 6  The findings 
indicated different patterns of catastrophic health expenditure across countries. In countries 
with advanced social protection systems such as Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the 
UK, Germany and France, the proportion of households incurring catastrophic health 
expenditure was less than 0.1%. Catastrophic health expenditure was found to be common in 
some countries in transition, middle-income countries, in certain Latin American countries 
and several low-income countries with over 10% in Vietnam and Brazil. Lower income 
groups were generally found to be more likely to incur catastrophic health expenditure as 
compared to higher income groups. However, the highest rate of catastrophic health 
expenditure was not observed in the lowest income group, which may again reflect issues 
regarding the affordability of health care.  
                                                          
6
 Turkey was not included in the analysis, which may reflect a lack of suitable data. 
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With respect to the factors that are likely to be associated with the risk of catastrophic 
health expenditure, in general, catastrophic health expenditure is associated with poverty or 
low income, unemployment, low levels of insurance coverage and having disabled, 
chronically ill or aging household members. Wyszewianski (1986), for example, found that 
ageing, unemployment and poverty were the most important risk factors in the U.S. for 
incurring catastrophic health expenditure. Similarly, Berki (1986) stated that poverty and not 
having health insurance coverage were among the risk factors associated with catastrophic 
expenditure on health care. 2¶'RQQHOOand Doorslaer (2005) investigated sources of variation 
in the incidence of catastrophic expenditure on health care across six Asian countries using 
household surveys. They found that having a highly educated household head, insurance 
coverage and living in an urban area were all inversely associated with the probability of 
incurring catastrophic health expenditure. The relationship between health insurance and its 
effect on out-of-pocket health expenditure is a widely discussed issue in the existing literature 
(e.g. Sepehri et al., 2006). Although it is expected that insurance coverage provides financial 
protection from catastrophic health expenditure, it is also possible for health insurance to 
create demand inducement, which may result in high levels of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). As Kawabata et al. (2002) argue, under 
insurance coverage, catastrophic health expenditure may not simply go away if the benefit 
package does not cover all of the health expenditure.  
There are only a small number of studies exploring catastrophic health expenditure in 
Turkey. For example, Yardim et al., (2009) investigated the factors associated with the risk of 
catastrophic health expenditure in Turkey using the 2006 Household Budget Survey. The 
results indicated that the health insurance coverage of the household head and living in an 
urban area were closely related to the risk of catastrophic health expenditure. Sulku and 
Bernard (2009), on the other hand, examined the role of the health insurance system in 
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providing adequate financial protection against high out-of-pocket health expenditure 
amongst individuals DJHG OHVV WKDQ\HDUVXVLQJ7XUNH\¶V1DWLRQDO+RXVHKROG
Health Expenditure Survey. They found that 19% of the non-elderly population were living in 
households where health expenditure exceeds 10% of their income. For poor households, 23% 
of the non-elderly population were living in households whose expenditure on health care is 
more than 20% of their income. Finally, Kisa et al. (2009) investigated the delayed use of 
health care services among the urban poor in Turkey. Their findings indicated that about 63% 
of poor households did not seek health care due to inability to pay, suggesting that the medical 
care seeking behaviour of poor households is an important issue in Turkey.  
2. Data and Methodology 
The empirical analysis is based on data drawn from the nationally representative Turkish 
Household Budget Surveys (HBS), 2003 to 2008, which are a time-series of repeated cross-
sections.7 In the surveys, households were replaced on a monthly basis by one with similar 
characteristics (TurkStat, 2006). For each month of the survey year, about 800 households 
participated, with the exception of 2003 during which about 2200 households were surveyed 
per month. 8  The surveys include four main groups of variables: variables relating to 
household assets (e.g. type of dwelling and ownership, facilities in the house, ownership of 
durables and transportation vehicles); expenditure on consumption; variables related to 
individuals (e.g. age, gender and education); and, finally, variables related to employment and 
income (e.g. occupation, profession and income from main economic activity). The data set, 
which is pooled over the six years, comprises 68,522 observations. In the health category, 
information is available on out-of-pocket health care expenditure including expenditure on 
                                                          
7
 A sample weight variable, which was provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute for each HBS, is used to 
correct for potential sampling bias.  
8
 The sample size of the 2003 HBS was increased in order to cover the whole of Turkey including all regions and 
26 proviQFHV WRFRQVWUXFW WKHQHZKDUPRQLVHGFRQVXPHUSULFH LQGH[ LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI WKH(8¶VKDUPRQLVDWLRQ
studies (TurkStat, 2006). 
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medicine and pharmacy products, treatment equipment, dentistry services, laboratories and X-
ray services, nursing care services and hospitalisation. 
Catastrophic health expenditure is defined at five threshold levels, 2.5%, 5%, 10%, 
15% and 20% of total household expenditure9, where the choice of these threshold levels is 
based on the existing literature, allowing us to provide a comprehensive picture of 
catastrophic health expenditure and to explore the sensitivity of the results. Table 1 presents 
the distribution of catastrophic health expenditure by the six survey years. It is apparent that 
the proportions of households incurring catastrophic health expenditure are similar across the 
years with the exception of 2008. The proportion of households with catastrophic health 
expenditure noticeably decreases in 2008, which is the year in which the Universal Health 
Insurance system was started to be implemented and is also the year of global financial crisis, 
which severely affected Turkey. From 2003 to 2008, between 16% and 18% of households 
spent more than 2.5% of their income on health care and between 1% and 2% of households 
reported health expenditure exceeding 20% of their total expenditure.  
A standard probit model is initially estimated, where the dependent variable takes the 
YDOXH RI  LI WKH KRXVHKROG¶V total out-of-pocket health expenditure exceeds the threshold 
level (i.e. if the household experienced catastrophic health expenditure) and 0 otherwise. The 
probit model takes the following form (see, Greene, 2012): ݕכ  ൌ  ݔᇱߚ ൅ ݁                                                     (1) 
where y* denotes a latent or unobserved variable, ȕ is a set of parameters, x is a vector of 
explanatory variables and the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and unit 
variance, e ~ N(0,1). We observe y =  1 if y* >  0 and y =  0 otherwise.  
                                                          
9
 All types of household expenditure are aggregated to obtain total household expenditure and all monetary 
values are adjusted for price inflation using the general Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2003. The CPI values for 
each year are as follows: 100 for 2003, 108.6 for 2004, 117.5 for 2005, 128.8 for 2006, 140 for 2007 and 154.6 
for 2008 (TurkStat, 2011). In addition, the reason for using total household expenditure as a proxy for income is 
that expenditure tends to be more accurately reported, is easier to measure and is measured with less error 
relative to current income measures particularly in developing countries (Deaton, 1997). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that total household expenditure is a better proxy for household income since savings allow smoothing of 
expenditure over time whereas income may be subject to transitory fluctuations (Deaton, 1997; Tansel, 2002). 
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As discussed above, it may be the case that some poor households delay dealing with 
their medical needs as they cannot afford out-of-pocket health care expenditure and, thus, they 
are not regarded as incurring catastrophic health expenditure as their health expenditure is 
zero. The standard probit approach outlined above does not take such considerations into 
account. The medical care seeking behaviour of households should ideally be accounted for in 
order to accurately assess the risk factors associated with incurring catastrophic health 
expenditure. In order to account for the health care seeking behaviour of households, we 
create a binary indicator for whether the household reports positive health expenditure. Since 
all members of all the health care insurance schemes in Turkey are required to pay a co-
payment for drug expenditure, this indicator provides information on their medical visits and 
serves as a proxy for health care seeking behaviour (Erus and Aktakke, 2012).10  
In order to control for the potential sample selection issue associated with the fact that 
households can only incur catastrophic health care expenditure if they actually seek and 
purchase health care, we follow the approach proposed by Sartori (2003). A more common 
approach to adjusting for selection bias in the economics literature is that proposed by 
Heckman (1979). A drawback of the Heckman selection model, however, is that the 
identification of the parameters in the model is based solely on the assumed distribution of the 
error terms unless there is an explanatory variable that affects the selection equation but not 
the outcome equation (Sartori, 2003). When theory suggests identical explanatory variables 
for both the selection and the outcome equations, Sartori (2003) argues that authors often try 
WR LGHQWLI\ DQ DUJXDEO\ WKHRUHWLFDOO\ µXQMXVWLILDEOH¶ H[FOXVLRQ UHVWULFWLRQ IRU WKH VHOHFWLRQ
equation to meet the modelling requirements. To overcome this problem, Sartori (2003) 
develops an estimator where identical explanatory variables are used in the selection and 
                                                          
10
 Unfortunately, the HBS do not include information on the utilisation of health services or the health status of 
household members. 
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outcome equations and the identification is based on the assumption of identical error terms in 
both equations for a given observation (discussed further below): 
ଵܷ௜ ൌ  ݔ௜ߛᇱ ൅ ݒଵ௜       (2) ܷଶ௜ ൌ  ݔ௜ߚᇱ ൅ ݒଶ௜        (3) 
Equation (2) is the selection equation, equation (3) is the outcome equation and U represents 
an unobserved continuous dependent variable. The explanatory variables, ݔ, are the same in 
both equations, but the coefficients, ߛ and ߚ are usually different. Each equation contains a 
normally distributed mean zero error term, ݒଵ and ݒଶ. The key difference between the Sartori 
and the Heckman approaches to modelling selection is that the former makes the assumption 
that ݒଵ ൌ  ݒଶ  while the latter assumes that the error terms follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with a freely estimable correlation parameter.11  Rather than observing the U 
terms, two dichotomous variables, ܼଵ௜  and ܼଶ௜, are observed ܼଵ௜ ൌ  ?݂݅  ଵܷ௜ ൏  ?ǡ ଵܼ௜ ൌ  ?݂݅  ଵܷ௜ ൒  ?       (4) ܼଶ௜ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܷଶ௜ ൏  ?ǡ ଶܼ௜ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܷଶ௜ ൒  ?        (5) 
where ܼଵ௜  indicates whether or not the observation is selected (i.e. whether the household 
seeks health care) and ܼଶ௜ represents the observed outcome (i.e. whether the household incurs 
catastrophic health expenditure). Following Sartori (2003) we define three random variables, 
௜ܻ௝, such that  
௜ܻ଴ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܼଵ ൌ  ?and 0 otherwise;            (6) 
௜ܻଵ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܼଵ ൌ  ? and ܼଶ ൌ  ? and 0 otherwise;          (7) 
௜ܻଶ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܼଵ ൌ  ?and ܼଶ ൌ  ? and 0 otherwise;          (8) 
where ௜ܻ଴  takes the value 1 if the observation is not selected, ௜ܻଵ  takes the value 1 if the 
observation is selected and the value of the outcome variable is 0 and ௜ܻଶ takes the value 1 if 
                                                          
11
 The Sartori model can be thought of as a Heckman selection model with the correlation parameter constrained 
to 1. Sartori also discusses an alternative model in which the correlation is set to -1 but this is less relevant in the 
present context. 
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the observation is selected and the value of the outcome variable is 1. The probability that 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ  ? in each case is defined as ܲݎሺ ௜ܻ଴ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߔሺെݔ௜ߛ ƍሻ        (9) ܲݎሺ ௜ܻଵ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߔሺെݔ௜ߚƍሻ െ ߔሺെݔ௜ߛ ƍሻ݂݅ሺߛ ƍ െ ߚƍሻݔ௜ ൌ  ?and 0 otherwise    (10) ܲݎሺ ௜ܻଶ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߔሺݔ௜ߚƍሻ݂݅ሺߛ ƍ െ ߚƍሻݔ௜ ൐  ?and ߔሺݔ௜ߛ ƍሻif ሺߛ ƍ െ ߚƍሻݔ௜ ൑  ?    (11) 
where Ɏ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. Sartori argues that the 
assumption of identical error terms is more likely to hold if the processes behind the selection 
and outcome of interest are similar, if the selection and outcome have the same causes and if 
the two processes are close to each other in time and space. In the current application, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the processes behind seeking health care and incurring catastrophic 
health expenditure are similar. Indeed, the primary determinant for both seeking health care 
and incurring catastrophic health expenditure is poor health. Further, when calculating 
KRXVHKROGV¶ health expenditure we exclude insurance premiums, which are arguably 
anticipated in advance. As a consequence, seeking health care and experiencing catastrophic 
health expenditure arguably occur at the same time and place. It can therefore be argued that 
this setting largely satisfies the conditions set out by Sartori to justify the assumption of 
identical error terms.12 
The household-level covariates used in the analysis follow the existing literature and 
include controls for: household size including its squared term; urban residence; the 
household head not having health insurance13; the presence of a disabled or ill member in the 
household; a dummy indicator for a male household head; the highest level of education of 
the household head (distinguishing between primary education or less including elementary 
education, secondary education including any secondary level education and vocational 
                                                          
12
 In order to explore the robustness of the results we also estimated a Heckman selection model without 
exclusion restrictions. In addition, an alternative robustness check is explored by defining a constraint for the 
FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW EHWZHHQ WKH VHOHFWLRQ DQG RXWFRPH HUURU WHUPV ȡ at 0.5 for the Heckman selection 
model. The results, which reinforce the results of the Sartori selection model, are available on request. 
13
 This variable includes both public and private health insurance.  
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schools and higher education including any post-secondary education, where primary 
education or less is the omitted category); a poor household14; the number of preschool 
children in the household (aged under 5 years); the number of school children in the 
household (i.e. children aged 6-14 years); the number of elderly household members (aged 65 
and over); the employment status of the household head (where the omitted category is not 
working)15; and year (where 2003 is the omitted category). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the continuous variables and percentage 
distributions for selected categorical variables across the survey years used in the empirical 
analysis. There are some differences in the mean values of total monthly household 
expenditure across years but a consistently increasing trend across the years is not apparent. 
For example, total monthly expenditure slightly decreases from £367 (968 TL) in 2006 to 
£360 (938 TL) in 2007.16 The mean value of monthly total (out-of-pocket) health expenditure 
ranges from £7 (17 TL) to £8.3 (20.3 TL), which initially appears quite small.17 However, 
these mean values for total out-of-pocket expenditure also include the households with zero 
health expenditure. When only households with positive health expenditure are considered, 
the mean values for total health expenditure ranges from £14 (33 TL) to £17 (42 TL). With 
respect to household characteristics, the average household size is around 4 over the 6 year 
period. The mean number of preschool children is about 0.4 and the mean number of school 
children is between 0.7 and 0.8 across the survey years. Similarly, the average number of 
                                                          
14
 The relative poverty definition of the OECD is used to denote poor households. According to this definition, 
the poverty line is set at 60% of equivalised median total expenditure. In order to obtain equivalised median 
expenditure, the total expenditure of each household is divided by the OECD equivalence household size which 
is an aggregate indicator of household size. This equivalence approach assigns a value of 1 to the first adult, of 
0.5 to each additional adult aged 14 and above and of 0.3 to each child under the age 14. The median value of 
equivalised expenditure is then FDOFXODWHG,IWKHKRXVHKROG¶s equivalised total expenditure does not exceed 60% 
of equivalised median total expenditure, it is labelled a poor household. 
15
 This variable has three different categories: not working (including the unemployed, students, the retired, 
unpaid family workers, housewives, ill/disabled members), employed and self-employed. 
16
 TL denotes Turkish Lira. 
17
 To compare the expenditure values internationally, purchasing power parity (PPP) for actual individual 
consumption was 0.7159 in 2003, 0.7783 in 2004, 0.8178 in 2005, 0.8755 in 2006, 0.9151 in 2007 and 0.9220 in 
2008 for Turkish Lira (OECD, 2011). This means that nearly 92 TL was equal to 100 PPP US dollars in 2008. 
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elderly members living in the household does not change significantly over the period. In 
2003, 21 RI WKH VDPSOH LV ODEHOOHG DV µSRRU¶ DQG WKLV UDWH KDV LQFUHDVHG WR 3% in 2004. 
After 2004, there is a consistently decreasing trend in the poverty rates. Interestingly, across 
the sample period, 64% of poor households report zero expenditure on health care. Finally, 
there has been a marked decrease over time in the proportion of households in which the 
household head does not have health insurance. This trend may reflect the fact that one of the 
aims of the HTP is to increase insurance coverage rates, with a series of reforms introduced 
encouraging firms to insure their workers as well as auditing workplaces to check the 
insurance coverage status of employees. The trend observed in our data suggests that such 
policies may have been successful in leading to an increase in the number of individuals 
having health insurance. 
3. Results 
The marginal effects from the probit and Sartori selection models are presented in Tables 3 
and 4, respectively. It can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 that the risk factors associated with 
experiencing catastrophic health expenditure are robust across all definitions (i.e. different 
threshold levels) of catastrophic health expenditure in both models. There are only some 
slight differences in the statistical significance levels of the effects of the highest educational 
attainment, the employment status of the household head, location of residence and year 
controls.  
The results of the probit model presented in Table 3 indicate that poor households are 
less likely to experience catastrophic health expenditure as compared to non-poor households. 
In accordance with a priori expectations, households with a disabled or ill member and 
households with more preschool and/or elderly members are more likely to incur catastrophic 
health expenditure. In accordance with the findings in the existing literature, living in an 
urban area and insurance coverage are found to be protective factors against the risk of 
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catastrophic health expenditure. The results also indicate that there is a statistically significant 
and negative association between the likelihood of catastrophic health expenditure and 
household size.18 
Many of the statistically significant risk factors in the Sartori selection model, which 
are presented in Table 4, are generally similar to those in the probit model. The selection part 
of the model represents the probability of seeking health care whereas the outcome part 
represents the probability of experiencing catastrophic health expenditure adjusted for the 
selection process.  
The most pronounced finding relates to the association between the poverty status of 
the household and the likelihood of incurring catastrophic health expenditure after accounting 
for the househROG¶V KHDOWK FDUH VHHNLQJ SRVLWLRQ 7KH UHVXOWV IURP the selection equation 
indicate that poor households are much less likely to seek health care than non-poor 
households for all threshold levels, which is consistent with the hypothesis that poor 
households may not seek health care due to affordability concerns. However, the results also 
suggest that poor households are less likely to experience catastrophic health expenditure as 
compared to non-poor households even after accounting for the potential selection problem.  
This finding may reflect a particular aspect of the Turkish health care system related to the 
fact that it is commonly accepted that patients receive a better quality service in private health 
care facilities (Savas et al., 2002). Before the health reforms, patients using private health care 
were paying for services out-of-pocket, even if they had health insurance. After the health 
reforms, however, access to private facilities was improved but extra-billing is allowed to 
encourage private sector to make contracts with the SSI. It can be argued that this 
improvement in access to private health care particularly benefited the non-poor segment of 
the population who can afford to pay the extra charge imposed by the private provider. As 
                                                          
18
 The marginal effects of household size shown in the tables represent one unified marginal effect for household 
size and its squared term, which is calculated by using the Stata command for nonlinear combinations of 
estimators. 
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Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) argue, it is possible for health insurance to create demand 
inducement, and this demand increase may result in high levels of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure. It is possible, therefore, that the improvements in access to private health 
facilities have increased the demand among non-poor households who prefer private health 
care to public health care. This increase in demand could have led to a higher probability of 
incurring catastrophic health expenditure for non-poor households. 
The results from the Sartori selection model presented in Table 4 confirm the results 
from the probit model in terms of the protective effect of health insurance coverage against 
catastrophic health expenditure. Furthermore, as expected, the results of the selection equation 
indicate that households without any health insurance coverage are less likely to seek health 
care as compared to households with health insurance coverage. This finding confirms the 
important role of insurance coverage in terms of providing financial protection. However, 
19% of household heads do not have any health insurance in this sample and only 23% of 
poor household heads have health insurance. This highlights the vulnerability of poor 
households to the risk of catastrophic health expenditure.  
The results further indicate that the presence of a disabled or ill individual in the 
household is positively associated with the probability of seeking health care and has the 
largest marginal effect in the outcome equation for all threshold levels. This finding indicates 
that the presence of a disabled or ill individual in the household appears to be the most 
important risk factor for incurring catastrophic health expenditure for the period considered in 
this study. The results also support protective effects from educational attainment and living 
in an urban area on the probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditure. Urban 
residence is also associated with a higher probability of seeking health care as compared to 
rural residence which may be due to, for example, better access to health care facilities.  
 17 
 
The age composition of the household is also important in terms of the risk of 
experiencing catastrophic health expenditure. The number of members of the household 
belonging to more risky groups in terms of health status, i.e. those aged under 5 or above 65, 
are both positively associated with a high risk of experiencing catastrophic health expenditure. 
Further, the results from the selection equation indicate that an increase in the number of 
preschool children and elderly household members are both positively related to the 
KRXVHKROG¶V KHDOWK FDUH VHHNLQJ SURSHQVLW\ 7KHVH ILQGLQJV DUH QRW VXUSULVLQJ VLQFH HOGHUO\
household members generally need more frequent, as well as expensive, health care and, in 
addition, they tend to have significantly reduced income (or they may be living as a dependent 
of other family members). Similarly, having more preschool children may lead to an increased 
demand for health care since they may experience early age illnesses as well as needing more 
preventive health care services.  
Finally, the results of the Sartori selection model reinforce the results of the probit 
model in terms of the negative association between the likelihood of catastrophic health 
expenditure and household size. In general, larger households are more likely to be 
concentrated in the lower socioeconomic quintiles and have more dependent individuals and, 
thus, they are more likely to have limited resources for health care. However, it may also be 
the case that large households pool their income which may decrease the risk of experiencing 
catastrophic health expenditure. Having more income earners in the household, for example, 
may also lead to such an association. The results from the selection equation indicate that 
larger households have a higher probability of seeking health care compared to smaller 
households.  
Additionally, with the exception of 2008, the year controls are, where statistically 
significant, positively associated with seeking health care. On the other hand, the negative 
relationship between experiencing catastrophic health expenditure and the 2008 year control 
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may reflect the financial crisis in 2008, which severely affected Turkey and may have led to a 
decrease in health expenditure.  
4. Conclusion  
This paper has explored the risk factors associated with experiencing catastrophic health 
expenditure at the household level in Turkey, which is an area of particular policy interest 
given the ongoing reforms to the Turkish health care system. This study is the first attempt to 
investigate the determinants of catastrophic health expenditure in Turkey which takes the 
medical care seeking behaviour of households into account and, hopefully, will serve to 
stimulate further research in this area. Our results suggest that poor households are less likely 
to seek health care relative to non-poor households, which highlights the vulnerability of poor 
households in terms of health care availability and implies that special attention should be 
devoted to overcoming the health care barriers faced by poor households in Turkey. For 
example, providing health services allowing for both geographical and financial access for 
poor households and increasing insurance coverage rates, especially among the poor, may 
encourage individuals to seek health care. On the other hand, the results indicate that poor 
households are less likely than non-poor families to incur catastrophic health expenditure 
even after accounting for the medical care seeking behaviour of households. This may 
arguably be attributed to preferences in favour of private health care facilities among the non-
poor, which in itself reflects an important existing inequality between poor and non-poor 
households in Turkey. We also find that attempting to adjust for the potential selection bias 
does not in general have a qualitative impact on the results, but allowing for selection does 
particularly increase the effect of the poverty status of the household in terms of magnitude, 
which highlights the importance of controlling for such considerations.  
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Table 1: Percentage of Households with Catastrophic Health Expenditure by Survey 
Year and Threshold   
Threshold/Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2.5% 15.6 17 17.5 17.6 17.1 15.7 
5% 9.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.5 8.4 
10% 4.7 5.4 5.4 5.2 5 3.8 
15% 2.5 3 3.1 2.8 2.9 2 
20% 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.2 
Note: For the denominator, all types of household expenditure are aggregated to obtain total household 
expenditure and all monetary values are adjusted for price inflation using the general Consumer Price 
Index (2003).   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Continuous Variables and Percentage 
Distributions for the Categorical Variables across Survey Years       
Continuous Variables* 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total monthly exp. per 
household in £ (TL) 
St. Dev. 
Min 
Max 
336.9 
(820.4TL) 
301.8 
7.23 
7524.6 
319.6 
(832.2TL) 
272.5 
20.8 
5960.6 
384.3 
(937.2TL) 
318.7 
8.7 
4788.3 
366.9 
(968.3TL) 
293.3 
11 
4192.8 
360.7 
(938.3TL) 
275.8 
13.9 
6750.1 
416.8 
(993.4TL) 
311.9 
5.9 
4411.6 
Total monthly health exp. 
per household in £ (TL) 
St. Dev. 
Min 
Max 
7 
(17 TL) 
33.8 
0 
2232.6 
7 
(18.1 TL) 
27.5 
0 
815.4 
8.3 
(20.3 TL) 
35.5 
0 
1717.5 
7.8 
(20.7 TL) 
34.5 
0 
1544.6 
7.8 
(20.4 TL) 
36.1 
0 
1109.5 
7.5 
(17.8 TL) 
40 
0 
2695.8 
Mean total monthly health 
exp. in non-zero 
households in £ (TL) 
St. Dev. 
Min 
Max 
 
17.1 
(41.7 TL) 
51.3 
0.01 
2232.6 
 
15.3 
(39.8 TL) 
39.2 
0.02 
815.4 
 
16.4 
(40.1 TL) 
48.5 
0.02 
1717.5 
 
14.9 
(39.4 TL) 
46.5 
0.01 
1544.6 
 
15.3 
(40 TL) 
49.4 
0.03 
1109.5 
 
13.8 
(33 TL) 
53.6 
0.03 
2695.8 
Household size 
St. Dev. 
Max 
4.17 
2.04 
23 
4.14 
2.02 
19 
4.14 
2.04 
22 
4.08 
1.89 
23 
4.04 
1.99 
22 
3.89 
1.83 
23 
Children:  <5 yrs 
St. Dev. 
Max 
0.43 
0.72 
6 
0.42 
0.72 
6 
0.41 
0.70 
6 
0.41 
0.69 
7 
0.39 
0.69 
8 
0.37 
0.66 
5 
Children: 6-14 yrs 
St. Dev. 
Max 
0.78 
1.05 
9 
0.78 
1.05 
7 
0.80 
1.07 
11 
0.76 
1.03 
9 
0.74 
1.02 
8 
0.69 
0.97 
10 
Elderly: 65+ yrs 
St. Dev. 
Max 
0.25 
0.56 
4 
0.24 
0.54 
3 
0.25 
0.55 
3 
0.24 
0.54 
3 
0.24 
0.55 
3 
0.26 
0.56 
3 
Categorical Variables (%) 
Education of household head (reference: primary or less) 
Primary (or less)  74 72.8 74.6 73.8 73.3 70 
Secondary  16.6 17.7 16.3 16.5 17.2 18.2 
Higher  9.4 9.5 9.1 9.7 9.5 11.8 
Employment status of household head (reference: not employed) 
Not employed 30.1 30.6 30.3 28.6 31.2 32 
Employed 40 41.1 41.6 44.6 42.8 42.8 
Self-employed 29.9 28.3 28.1 26.8 26 25.2 
Poverty 
Poor 20.5 22.6 21.7 21.5 20.7 20.8 
Gender of the household head 
Male 90.5 89.4 89.7 89.9 89.3 88.6 
Presence of disabled or ill member in the household 
Yes 3.7 11.1 10.8 11.5 11.9 13.0 
Health insurance status of the household head 
No 26.1 21.9 18.9 13.9 11.5 8.9 
Location of the residence 
Urban 70.9 70.0 69.9 69.3 68.9 69.7 
Num. of  Obs. 25764 8544 8559 8558 8548 8549 
Notes: *All monetary values are adjusted for price inflation using the general CPI 2003 and are converted to £ 
using average exchange rate data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Electronic Data Delivery 
System. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results of the Probit Model 
Variables/Threshold 2.5% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
 Marg.Eff.         St Err. Marg.Eff.         St Err. Marg.Eff.         St Err. Marg.Eff.         St Err. Marg.Eff.         St Err. 
Poor -0.059***          0.004 -0.041***          0.003 -0.022***          0.002 -0.012***           0.001 -0.007***          0.001 
No health insurance  0.037***          0.005  0.032***          0.004  0.020***          0.003  0.014***           0.002  0.010***          0.002 
Disabled/ ill member  0.086***          0.007  0.064***          0.006  0.045***          0.005  0.026***           0.003  0.017***          0.002 
Secondary education -0.001                0.005 -0.003                0.004 -0.004                0.002 -0.002                 0.002 -0.001                0.001 
Higher education  0.012*              0.006 -0.001                0.005 -0.010***          0.003 -0.005**             0.002 -0.003*              0.001 
Employed  0.005                0.005  0.003                0.004 -0.005*              0.002 -0.002                 0.002  0.0009              0.001 
Self-employed  0.019***          0.005  0.017***          0.004  0.007**            0.003  0.002                 0.002  0.002                0.001 
Male -0.001                0.007 -0.002                0.005  0.003                0.003  0.001                 0.002  0.001                0.001 
Household size -0.003***          0.001 -0.004***          0.001 -0.005***          0.000 -0.003***           0.000 -0.002***          0.000 
Urban  0.003                0.004 -0.001                0.003 -0.007***          0.002 -0.005***           0.001  -0.004***          0.001 
Preschool (under age 5)  0.031***          0.003  0.020***          0.002  0.011***          0.001  0.003**             0.001  0.001                0.001 
Children (age 6 to 14) -0.003                0.002 -0.001                0.002  0.0006              0.001  0.0002               0.001  0.0003              0.000 
Elderly (age 65+)  0.036***          0.003  0.022***          0.002  0.012***          0.001  0.007***           0.001  0.005***          0.000 
2004  0.013**            0.005  0.011**            0.004  0.006**            0.003  0.003                 0.002  0.002                0.001 
2005  0.022 ***         0.006  0.010**            0.004  0.005                0.003  0.003                 0.002  0.0002              0.001 
2006  0.018 ***         0.006  0.006                0.004  0.003                0.003  0.001                 0.002  0.001                0.001 
2007  0.019***          0.006  0.012**            0.004  0.003                0.003  0.002                 0.002  0.0004              0.001 
2008  0.002                0.005 -0.016***          0.004 -0.009***          0.003 -0.005***           0.002 -0.003**            0.001 
Log Likelihood -30148.409 -21984.761 -12970.96 -8140.629 -5362.009 
LR chi2 1028.58 (19) 878.35 (19) 765.96 (19) 567.44 (19) 432.86 (19) 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R Square 0.016 0.019 0.028 0.033 0.038 
Number of Obs. 68522 68522 68522 68522 68522 
Notes: (1) ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; (2) The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory variables.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results of the Sartori Selection Model 
Variables/Threshold 10% 2.5% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
 Selection Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Poor -0.177*** (0.005) -0.070***    (0.004) -0.051***    (0.003) -0.025***    (0.002) -0.015***    (0.001) -0.008***   (0.001) 
No health insurance -0.008*     (0.005)  0.026***    (0.003)  0.023***    (0.002)  0.015***    (0.001)  0.010***    (0.001)  0.007***   (0.001) 
Disabled/ ill member  0.116*** (0.007)  0.087***    (0.004)  0.057***    (0.003)  0.034***    (0.002)  0.019***    (0.001)  0.011***   (0.001) 
Secondary education -0.023*** (0.005) -0.010**      (0.003) -0.007**      (0.003) -0.004**      (0.002) -0.004**      (0.001) -0.002*       (0.001) 
Higher education -0.006       (0.006)  0.008*        (0.004) -0.003          (0.004) -0.009***    (0.002) -0.006***    (0.002) -0.002*       (0.001) 
Employed  0.015*** (0.005)  0.005          (0.003)  0.0006        (0.003) -0.004*        (0.002) -0.002          (0.001) -0.0007       (0.001) 
Self-employed  0.025*** (0.005)  0.018***    (0.004)  0.013***    (0.003)  0.006***    (0.002)  0.002          (0.001)  0.001         (0.001) 
Male  0.007       (0.007)  0.002          (0.005)  0.004          (0.004)  0.003          (0.002)  0.0002        (0.001)  0.0001       (0.001) 
Household size  0.020*** (0.001) -0.004***    (0.001) -0.005***    (0.000) -0.005***    (0.000) -0.003***    (0.000) -0.002***   (0.000) 
Urban  0.023*** (0.004) -0.005*        (0.003) -0.007***    (0.002) -0.009***    (0.001) -0.006***    (0.001) -0.004***   (0.000) 
Preschool (under age 5)  0.029*** (0.003)  0.029***    (0.002)  0.021***    (0.001)  0.012***    (0.001)  0.004***    (0.000)  0.002***   (0.000) 
Children (age 6 to 14) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.001          (0.001) -0.001          (0.001)  0.0003        (0.001)  0.00003      (0.000)  0.0005       (0.000) 
Elderly (age 65+)  0.050*** (0.003)  0.032***    (0.002)  0.021***    (0.002)  0.012***    (0.001)  0.007***    (0.000)  0.005***   (0.000) 
2004  0.046*** (0.006)  0.010**      (0.004)  0.008**      (0.003)  0.004**      (0.002)  0.003**      (0.001)  0.003**     (0.001) 
2005  0.096*** (0.006)  0.015***    (0.004)  0.007**      (0.003)  0.004*        (0.002)  0.004**      (0.001)  0.001         (0.001) 
2006  0.115*** (0.006)  0.016***    (0.004)  0.008**      (0.003)  0.003          (0.002)   0.001          (0.001)  0.0007       (0.001) 
2007  0.100*** (0.006)  0.012***    (0.004)  0.006*        (0.003)  0.002          (0.002)  0.002*        (0.001)  0.001         (0.001) 
2008  0.131*** (0.006) -0.002          (0.004) -0.016***    (0.003) -0.010***    (0.002) -0.006***    (0.001) -0.003**     (0.001) 
Log Likelihood -56455.081 -66599.621 -62486.351 -56455.081 -52818.671 -50604.38 
Number of Obs. 68522 68522 68522 68522 68522 68522 
Notes: (1) For the results of the selection part of the model, only the results of the 10% threshold level are presented since the results are virtually the same for the other 
threshold levels; (2) ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 and standard errors are presented in brackets; (3) The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory 
variables.  
